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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This matter comes within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(h). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues are presented for review by the court: (a) Whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in modifying child support payments based on Appellant's 
overtime pay; (b) the order for appellant to pay private school tuition rather than 
reasonably incurred day care; (c) whether or not the trial court had proper jurisdiction 
when Appellee was a listed creditor in Appellant's bankruptcy; (d) and whether or not the 
Appellee should have been awarded attorney's fees. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
A. A trial court's factual findings will not be altered unless it is clearly 
erroneous. Sigg v. Sigg. 905 P.2d 908, 912 (Utah App. 1995). The legal conclusion and 
awarding of child support will not be overturned without a clear abuse of discretion. 
Reinhart v. Reinhart 963 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah App., 1998). 
The issue is preserved on the record at R. 294 - 296, R. 250 - 252, T. 154. (Note 
to reader: Trial transcript was not indexed. All cites to trial transcript are "T" followed by 
the page number.) 
B. Should Appellee have been awarded attorney's fees. 
The trial court awarded attorney's fees and attorney's fees are 
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in the broad discretion of the court, and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 
discretion. Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee had filed a Petition to Modify Paternity Decree and Motion for Judgment 
against Appellant. The petition sought to modify the decree by increasing appellant's 
child support, force payment of medical, day care, school costs, and attorneys' fees. The 
Honorable Frank G. Noel held trial on the matter on August 13, 2003 and on October 27, 
2003 an order was entered in favor of the Appellee. A timely notice of appeal was filed 
on November 12, 2003. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Rebecca Wardle ("Wardle") and Ricky Ray Bowen ("Bowen") openly admit that 
they are the natural parents of Lexington Wardle ("Lexington"), bom December 13, 1994, 
pursuant to a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity. (R. 17). In 1997 a formal 
judgment and order was made via the Office of Recovery Services. (R. 6-16 and 235-
246). The order required Bowen, the non-custodial parent, to pay $214.00 per month 
based on the Utah Child Support Guidelines. (R. 6,235). Bowen5s gross monthly 
income at the time was $1,846.00. (R. 244). Additionally, the order required the parents 
to share equally medical and day-care expenses. (R. 235-236). Bowen consistently met 
these requirements through February of 2000, at which point the circumstances of 
Lexington's day care changed. (T. 70). 
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Lexington initially attended day care with Wardle's sister at a cost of 
approximately $120.00 per month. (R. 251; Exhibit M: 55; T. 73). This met Lexington's 
needs for a while, but eventually Wardle placed her daughter in pre-school at Challenger 
School at the beginning of 1998. (T. 68). In a letter to Bowen, Wardle told him that she 
wanted Lexington to attend a school to be around other children as well as learn. (T. 69). 
This decision was made without consulting Bowen and was a substantial increase in 
price. (T. 69). Lexington's attendance at the Challenger School cost a total of $640 per 
month, and Bowen refused to pay. (R. 251). Bowen continued to pay the $120 per 
month, which was the previous amount of day care, despite his receipt of Challenger 
tuition bills that were obviously higher. (T. 70). 
Bowen has maintained employment at Worldcom for the last several years. His 
regular salary in 2001 and 2002 has been $42,302.60 and $41,216.68 respectively. 
(Exhibit M, attached pay stubs). Over the last few years, Bowen, has worked varying 
amounts of overtime due to his high expenses (Exhibit M: 13). The overtime is 
voluntary, meaning he chooses whether or not to work overtime. (Exhibit M: 13). 
Bowen's overtime has not been consistent due to his various health problems and whether 
or not it was offered by this employer or if someone of higher status "takes" the overtime. 
(Exhibit M: 13, 16). A portion of the overtime is from what is known as "standby". 
(Exhibit M: 53). Standby is volunteer overtime that requires the employee to be on call 
and ready to respond to calls for a stretch of time. (Exhibit M: 53). In 2002 and 2001 
3 
Bowen received $30, 645.15 and $9,398.56 respectively in overtime wages. In the year 
2000 Bowen reported on his tax returns a total of earned wages of $37,557. (R. 329). 
In late 1999 Bowen was forced to declare bankruptcy. (T. 91). Wardle received 
notice of the bankruptcy and was listed as a creditor in early 2000. (T. 90-91). Although 
Wardle received notice of the discharge she failed to ultimately make any claim in the 
bankruptcy court. (T. 92). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The issues to be considered in this case is whether or not the trial court abused its 
discretion in its decisions pertaining to the modification of child support. First, the trial 
court determined Bowen's income to be at $60,000 including some overtime. This was 
an abuse of the court's discretion in the light of Bowen's inconsistent earnings over the 
years as well as the trial court's improper use of overtime in consideration of child 
support pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5(2). Secondly, the court ordered Bowen 
to pay for private school tuition as substitution for day care. This is despite the 
substantial cost differences and also in violation of the contractual agreement of the two 
parties based on the Office of Recovery Services order. Third, the trial court did not have 
jurisdiction to consider the non-dischargeability of day care cost. Under 11 U.S.C. 
§523(a)(15), a creditor must make a claim within 60 days of notice of discharge or else be 
precluded from recovery. Finally, should the Appellee have been awarded attorney fees 
when Appellant does not have the means or ability to pay the same. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
MODIFYING THE CHILD SUPPORT AND ORDERING 
PAYMENT FOR PRIVATE SCHOOL. 
The modification of child support and order to pay for private school tuition 
was an abuse of discretion by the trial court, because the court failed to accurately 
depict Bowen's income in respect to voluntary overtime and incorrectly substituted 
private school tuition for Bowen's responsibility for a 50% share in payment of 
day care. Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.2(2)(a) requires the trial court to apply the 
child support guidelines as a rebuttable presumption in establishing or modifying 
the amount of child support. Modifications in child support become proper only 
when a material change in circumstances can be shown by the party seeking 
modification. Brooks v. Brooks. 881 P. 2d 955, 958 (Utah Ct. App., 1994) (citing 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7(1 )(a)). On appeal the trial court is always granted 
substantial deference in its findings of fact, as well as given "considerable latitude" 
in determining relief. Christiansen v. Christiansen. 667 P.2d 592, 595 (Utah, 
1983). 
Once a material change of circumstances has occurred the following 
relevant factors are to be used in determining the support: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
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(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the support of others. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7(3). A trial court's factual findings will not be altered unless it 
is clearly erroneous. Siggv. Sigg. 905 P.2d 908, 912 (Utah App. 1995). The legal 
conclusion and awarding of child support will not be overturned without a clear abuse of 
discretion. Reinhart v. Reinhart 963 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah App., 1998). Furthermore, 
the trial court is required "to enter detailed and specific findings on all material issues 
which must be considered when making a child support award." Breinholt v. Breinholt 
905 P.2d 877, 881 (Utah App., 1995). Failure to make these material findings will lead to 
reversal except if the facts are so "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting on a 
finding in favor of the judgment. Id. at 881 citing Jeffries v. Jeffries, 752 P.2d 909, 
911(UtahApp. 1988). 
This brief will argue that first in conducting its analysis of Bowen's salary the 
Court included overtime in its determination in direct opposition to Utah Code Ann. §78-
45-7.5(2). Secondly, the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the payment of 
private school tuition when the contractual obligation of Bowen was merely for day care. 
Third, the trial court did not have jurisdiction in determining the dischargeability of the 
6 
day care fees pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(15). Finally, the trial court should not have 
awarded Wardle any attorneys fees. 
A. THE DETERMINATION OF BOWEN'S INCOME FOR THE 
PURPOSES OF DETERMINING CHILD SUPPORT SHOULD 
NOT INCLUDE ANY OVERTIME PAY, 
The trial court's determination of Bowen's income was an abuse of discretion and 
contrary to Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5(2), which states that, "Income from earned 
income sources is limited to the equivalent of one full-time 40-hour job." See also Jensen 
v. Bowcut 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah App., 1995). The law does have an exception, "if and 
only if during the time prior to the original support order, the parent normally and 
consistently worked more than 40 hours at his job, the court may consider this extra time 
as a pattern in calculating the parent's ability to provide support." Utah Code Ann. §78-
45-7.5(2). The trial court determined that Bowen's salary was $60,000 and included 
standby pay, a form of overtime. 
In Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah App., 1995) Bowcut was a doctor who 
had his own private practice and also was under contract to provide medical services to 
Utah County Jail.. The trial court found that this contract work emanated from his 
primary duties as a physician and furthermore found any time over 40 hours was 
consistent to meet the exception of 78-45-7.5(2). Id. The Court also addressed this issue 
in Hurt v. Hurt, 793 P.2d 948, 950 (Utah App., 1990). where the father argued that his 
history of substantial overtime should not be taken into account when determining child 
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support. The trial court disregarded his argument and the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
usage of overtime when there is a defined prior history of such overtime. Id. 
In this case Bowen has worked overtime but there is no "defined prior history" 
similar to Hurt In this case, the overtime fails to be consistent. In 2001 Bowen received 
regular pay (including vacation and sick time) of $46,395.25. Additionally he received 
$9,398.56 of overtime pay for both traditional overtime and standby pay. Standby is the 
rough equivalent of on-call time - a form of voluntary overtime where if a job needs to be 
done he is ready and waiting. In 2002, however, Bowen received $30,645.15 in overtime. 
By August of 2003 he had received $8,871.64 in overtime. The trial court set Bowen's 
salary at $60,000 per year. This is despite the fact that since 1998 Bowen has only made 
$60,000 or more twice. Furthermore in 2000, his reported W2 showed only a total 
earnings of $37,557. 
In 2001 and 2002 Bowen earned in regular wages $42,302.60 and $41,216.68. 
The large degree of variation from year to year is obviously attributable to Bowen's 
choice to work voluntary overtime based on his health at that particular time and the 
availability of overtime from the employer. Unlike Hurt and Jensen the overtime is not 
necessarily an intrinsic part of his job. Bowen's history of overtime is not consistent. It 
varies dramatically from 2000 to 2002. The trial court's determination of an income of 
$60,000 will make the choice of overtime for Bowen to be no longer voluntary and 
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consequently in contradiction to § 78-45-7.5(2) which requires salary to be based on a 40 
hour work week. The trial court in it's ruling stated, 
"...If it appears that someone is voluntarily taking overtime and it hasn't extended 
over a long period of time, simply to make ends meet, the Court doesn't feel that they 
should be included in the calculation. I'm not going to include overtime in this 
calculation." (T. 149) 
Despite this ruling and the calculations as shown above as to Bowen's income, the 
trial court in the very next sentence stated "I am going to find that the respondent in this 
case is earning $60,000 a year and we'll base child support based on the $60,000 a year 
and her income which is not disputed." (T. 149-150) 
These statements from the trial court and it's final ruling are inconsistent. The only way 
that the trial court could impute a $60,000 yearly income to Bowen is to include overtime 
and expect that he work the over time. 
The trial court was shown that Bowen works overtime in order to survive. Bowen 
is garnished $1,070 to pay for his children that he had prior to the relationship with 
Wardle. (Exhibit M: 57) (The monies payable to Wardle are also garnished.) The trial 
court was shown a 40 hour workweek pay stub of 7-20-02, that showed a total income of 
$887. After taxes, garnishments for support and insurance as required by both states, 
Bowen is left with $254 on which to live and pay his expenses and bills. (Exhibit M and 
trial transcript at p. 139) Without working overtime, Bowen would only have $1,100 a 
month to live on, to pay his rent, food, car payments, utilities, medical bills, etc. Bowen 
has, therefore, accepted overtime when available to meet his needs. The pay stubs of 
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Bowen, (contained in Exhibit M), show how insistent is the overtime. Bowen's monthly 
income, exclusive of overtime and standby time to August 2, 2003 was $3,633 per month, 
which would equal $43,601 annually, which is consistent with what he has earned in the 
two (2) prior years of 2001 and 2002. Only by including overtime and the standby time, 
which is overtime, can the court calculate Bowen's income to be $60,000. The trial court 
stated that it was not going to include the overtime, but it does include the overtime in 
order to arrive at the figure of $60,000 annual salary for Bowen. The figure that the trial 
court should have used for Bowen's income for the calculation of child support should 
have been $3,633 less the sum of $1,070 for the first family for a net income of $2,563. 
This would put his child support obligation at $266.77 rather than the $461.12 as awarded 
by the Court. In reviewing the factors contained in UCA. §78-45-7(3), Bowen's standard 
of living is meager, he has the responsibility to support others and he has health issues. 
The child support should not have been increased, and it was an abuse by the trial court to 
raise the support to $461.12. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
REQUIRED THE PAYMENT OF PRIVATE SCHOOL 
TUITION IN SUBSTITUTION OF DAY CARE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.16 allows for work-related child care expenses but not 
for private school tuition. The judgment and order by the ORS states, "That the non-
custodial parent shall pay an amount equal to one-half the child care expense actually 
10 
incurred by the custodial parent for reasonable work or training related costs for up to a 
full-time work week or training schedule." 
The Utah Court of Appeals has interpreted both divorce decrees and child support 
statements according to established rules of contract interpretation. Whitehouse v. 
Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57, 60 (Utah App. 1990). If the language of the "contract" is 
found to be unambiguous, "then the parties' intentions must be determined solely from 
the language of the contract." Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Association. 907 P.2d 264 
(Utah 1995). "Language in a written document is ambiguous if the words used may be 
understood to support two or more plausible meanings." Whitehouse, 790 P.2d at 60; see 
also R & R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus.. 936 P.2d 1068, 1074 (Utah 1997) ("To 
demonstrate ambiguity, the contrary positions of the parties must each be tenable.") 
Justification for determining a contract is ambiguous can be found if "the terms are either 
unclear or missing." Whitehouse, 790 P.2d at 60. 
The Order here is very clear in stating that day care is meant to be split equally 
amongst the parents. Wardle decided without consulting Bowen to send Lexington to the 
Challenger School to attend preschool. The Challenger School has a developed 
curriculum for their preschoolers and, at the age of five, students continue with 
kindergarten. Wardle does not claim the tuition from the child's kindergarten but only 
the preschool tuition viewing it as a suitable substitution for day care. 
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The trial court found that the preschool was similar to day care and allowed the 
payment of the private school tuition. Yet clearly this is in opposition to the contractual 
language of ORS order which only allows for payment of day care. Furthermore, the day 
care expenses dramatically shifted from $120.00 per month to $640.00 per month. Such a 
substitution of private school tuition for day care is not reasonable. Pursuant to UCA §78-
45-7.16, it requires parties to share reasonable daycare costs. $640 is not reasonable, and 
can only be seen as a tuition, not daycare. 
Bowen has always paid his share of all childcare expenses, his support obligation, 
and medical expenses that have been incurred on behalf of the child. The contractual 
nature of the ORS order requires an interpretation that Bowen was supposed to pay his 
equal share of day care and not private school tuition. The language is unambiguous and 
should be interpreted as such. Furthermore, any flexibility that the order might entail 
does not entirely give allowance for a $500 increase in child care expenses. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO 
DETERMINE THE DISCHARGEABILITY OF THE 
SUPPORT DEBTS. 
Bowen5 s filing of bankruptcy required Wardle, as a listed creditor, to file of claim 
of non-dischargeability within federal court for a debt that is covered by 11 U.S.C. 
§523(a)(15). The dischargeability of debt is ultimately a question of federal law. See 
Sampson v. Sampson On re Sampson), 997 F. 3d 717, 721 (10th Cir. 1993). A 
bankruptcy debtor may discharge all debts that arise before the date of the bankruptcy 
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court's order of relief, except for certain categories of debts enumerated in § 523 of the 
bankruptcy code. Polishuk v. Polishuk. 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19856 (D. Okla., 2000). 
Only federal courts have jurisdiction over claims brought under §523(a)(15). See 4 
Collier §523.03; Bowles & Allman, supra note 3, at 547 (citing §523(c)(l), which 
incorporates subsection (15), having the effect of "granting exclusive jurisdiction to 
federal courts over dischargeability actions under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(15)"). 
523(c)(1) provides that a debtor will be automatically discharged from a non-
dischargeable debt, "unless, on request of the creditor to whom such debt is owed, and 
after notice and a hearing, the court determines such debt" falls under 523(a)(15). A 
complaint to render a debt non-dischargeable must be filed within 60 days under Federal 
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4007(c). 
Wardle failed to make a claim of non-dischargeability. Failure to seek relief 
before expiration of the sixty-day deadline precludes non-dischargeability under 
subsection 523(a)(15). Puckett v. Puckett (In re Puckett). 206 B.R. 556, 560 (Bankr. 
W.D. Okl. 1997). The trial court did not have the jurisdiction to overcome this 
preclusion. 
2. THE APPELLEE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Bowen acknowledges that the trial court is given substantial latitude in awarding 
attorney's fees and that this court will not disturb the award absent an abuse of discretion. 
Bowen submits that the modification of the support award was ab abuse of discretion as were the 
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judgment amounts of day care. Further, Bowen is not in an financial position to bear the 
attorney's fees. His pay stubs show that he has very limited means and no ability to pay 
attorney's fees. The trial court should not have awarded any attorney's fees to Wardle. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons the trial court abused its discretion in its 
determination of the modification to Bowen's child support payments. Child support 
should be set at $266.77 and not the amount as awarded by the trial court. Specifically at 
issue is the inclusion of overtime wages in the determination of his salary as well as the 
order to pay private school tuition when it was not contractually mandated nor is the 
amount reasonable. The trial court did not have jurisdiction to decide on the 
dischargeability of day care costs. Further, attorney's fees should not have been granted 
to Wardle. 
Respectfully submitted this ( y ? day of Julyr-2004: 
Attorney for Appellant and Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this the (L / " day of July, 2004,1 mailed two (2) true and 
exact copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT postage prepaid in the United 
States Mail, to the following: 
STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 -3156 
Shararl Weaver 
Legal Assistant 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit A: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Exhibit B: Order on Petitioner's Petition to Modify Decree of Paternity and 
Motion for Judgment. 
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EXHIBIT A 
Steve S. Christensen (U.S.B. No. 6156) 
Lloyd E. Allen (U.S.B. No. 5586) 
HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3156 
Telephone: (801) 322-0593 
Facsimile: (801) 322-0594 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY , STATE OF UTAH 
REBECCA J. WARDLE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
RICKY RAY BOWEN, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 970903297 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
Commissioner Susan Bradford 
This matter came on for hearing. Neither party appeared in person nor by counsel. 
The parties have entered into a Stipulation wherein: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. JURISDICTION. 
a. There is reference in the court file to a bankruptcy having been filed by 
Respondent. 
UKIGM 
FUED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
•Jt 
OCT 2 7 2003 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
) 
Deputy Clerk 
b. The court finds that this case involves child care and medical expenses 
for a child of the parties. 
c. Because the parties have set aside no money for day care, because day 
care is of limited duration, and because Utah courts typically require both 
parents to contribute to the children's medical expenses and day care 
expenses for work related purposes on a fifty fifty pro rata basis, this court 
determines that such expenses were in the nature of family support. 
2. MEDICAL AND DAYCARE EXPENSES 
a. From the date of August 10, 1998 to August 13, 2003, Petitioner 
incurred child care expenses of $16,752.00. 
b. Respondent's share of the child care expenses for the period specificed in 
Paragraph 2 above were $8,376.00. 
c. Respondent paid $2,351.00 towards child care for the period specified in 
Paragraph 2 above. 
d. Respondent is awarded a judgment of $6,025.00 representing one half of 
her out of pocket day care and medical expenses on behalf of the parties' 
minor child with a credit for amounts paid. 
2 
e. From the date of August 10, 1998 to August 13, 2003, Petitioner 
incurred medical expenses on behalf of the parties1 minor child of 
$3,719.23. 
f. Respondent's share of the medical expenses on behalf of the parties' 
minor child for the period specificed in Paragraph 6 above were $1,859.62. 
g. Respondent paid $809.61 towards medical expenses on behalf of the 
parties' minor child for the period specified in Paragraph 6 above. 
h. Respondent is awarded a judgment of $1,050.01 representing one half of 
her out of pocket day medical expenses on behalf of the parties' minor child 
with a credit for amounts paid. 
i. All day care expenses incurred, including those incurred at Challenger 
Day Care are fair and reasonable. 
i. Respondent presented no evidence that any fees incurred by 
Petitioner were unreasonable. 
ii. Petitioner has not requested reimbursement from Respondent 
for any costs of private schooling for times when the parties' minor child 
could have been in public school. 
iii. Petitioner has born the cost alone for private schooling for the 
parties' minor child. 
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j . MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT 
k. The court finds that the prior Order of child support dated March 1, 1997 
was $214.00 (two hundred fourteen dollars) a month was based on incomes 
of $1,846.00 (one thousand eight hundred forty six dollars) for the 
Respondent and $1,387.00 (one thousand three hundred eighty seven 
dollars) for the Petitioner. 
i. Petitioner's income is now $2,894.00 (two thousand eight 
hundred ninety four dollars) per month. 
ii. For purposes of calculating child support, since the Petition 
for Modification of the Decree of Paternity was filed, the court will find 
that the income of the Respondent for child support purposes is $60,000.00 
(sixty thousand dollars). 
1. The court finds that a change in Respondent's income from $1,846.00 
(one thousand eight hundred forty six dollars) to income of $5,000.00 (five 
thousand dollars) is a substantial change of circumstances pursuant to UCA 
§78-45-1 etseq. 
m. In determining the income to use for child support purposes for 
Respondent the court finds as follows: 
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i. the average gross income of the Respondent over the past 
three years has been $64,333.00 (sixty four thousand three hundred thirty 
three dollars). 
ii. Although the income of $64,333.00 (sixty four thousand three 
hundred thirty three dollars) would be the appropriate income for the court 
to use in calculating child support, the court exercises its discretion to use 
the amount of $60,000.00 a year as Respondent's income, acknowledging 
that the overtime of Respondent is voluntary. 
(1) The overtime of Respondent has been consistent and regular 
over the past five years. 
(2) Respondent's income for the first half of 2003 was 
approximately $38,000.00 (thirty eight thousand dollars). 
(3) Approximately $8,000.00 (eight thousand dollars) of 
Respondent's income was attributable to voluntary overtime 
pay. 
(4) The court determines that the overtime is voluntary and not 
required by his employer. 
iii. The court determines that child support pursuant to the 
current incomes of the parties is $461.12 (four hundred sixty one dollars 
5 
and twelve cents), which is more than double the prior support order. 
Therefore, by definition, this support is a substantial change in 
circumstances under UCA §78-45-1 et seq. 
3. RETROACTIVITY 
a. Because the income of Respondent has exceeded $5,000.00 (five 
thousand dollars) per year on average over the past three years, the court 
finds that it would be fair to make the new amount of child support 
retroactive to the date of February 1, 2001. 
b. The court finds that Respondent was served with a Petition to Modify 
Decree of Paternity in February, 2001. 
c. Petitioner is entitled to a judgment for the amount of child support not 
made based upon the retroactive order of the court. 
d. The court finds that of $461.12 (four hundred sixty one dollars and 
twelve cents) due each month in the thirty and one half months prior to this 
court hearing, $214.00 (two hundred fourteen dollars) a month was paid in 
support, leaving a difference of $247.12 (two hundred forty seven dollars 
and twelve cents) per month. Based upon the deficiency in each of the 
preceding thirty and one half months, Petitioner is entitled to a judgment for 
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past due child support of $7,537.94 (seven thousand five hundred thirty 
seven dollars and ninety four cents). 
e. The court entered a Decree of Paternity August 10, 1998. 
f. This Decree proported to resolve all issues between the parties as of the 
date the matter was submitted to the court. 
4. JUDGMENT INTEREST. 
a. The court finds that there is no statutory provision which would allow 
for judgment interest retroactively on the judgment set forth in this Order. 
b. Judgment interest will accrue from August 13, 2003 on the total 
judgment in favor of Petitioner is $20,612.95 (twenty thousand six hundred 
twelve dollars and ninety five cents). 
5. ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
a. Of the attorneys fees requested by Petitioner in the amount of 
$11,481.49, $6,000.00 were caused by Respondents refusal to follow this 
court's orders. 
b. To the extent that Respondent has caused the need for this litigation 
through his failure to follow the court's orders, Petitioner is awarded her 
fees and costs in the amount of $6,000.00. 
c. The attorneys' fees incurred by Petitioner are reasonable in this case. 
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i. A billing rate of $ 150.00 per hour is reasonable for an 
attorney with twelve years of experience in this community. 
ii. The work done by Petitioner's counsel in this case was 
reasonable and necessary in order to represent Petitioner's interests. 
d. Petitioner has prevailed on most issues in this case. 
e. Because of the regular overtime hours which Respondent works and 
because his income is more than double the income of Respondent, on 
average, Respondent has the ability to assist Petitioner with her attorneys' 
fees. 
f. Petitioner is in debt and is unable to meet all of her needs and her 
attorneys fees on her current income, the court also finds that Petitioner is 
unable to pay $6,000.00 (six thousand dollars) of her attorneys' fees. 
g. There was insufficient evidence submitted to the court supporting the 
proposition that Respondent did not have the ability to assist Petitioner with 
her attorneys fees. 
h. There was no evidence submitted to the court supporting the proposition 
that Petitioner had the ability to pay her own attorneys fees from her income 
or from other assets. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the court concludes that a 
modification in judgment consistent with the foregoing findings is warranted under Utah 
law. 
2. The Decree of Paternity of August 10, 1998 had the effect of res judicata on all 
issues to that date. 
3. This court cannot retroactively modify the Decree of Paternity or order a 
judgment on claims arising prior to August 10,1998. 
4. Jurisdiction is proper in this court to determine whether a debt was discharged 
under 11 USC §523(a)(15). 
a. Divorce court orders which are not in the nature of family support 
require a hearing before the bankruptcy court because nondischargeability is 
discretionary. 
b. However, the court concludes that Bankruptcy Code §523(a)(15) makes 
debts in the nature of family support nondischargeable in a Chapter 7 
proceeding without a hearing 
c. The issue of whether a debt is in the nature of family support is best 
determined by the divorce court. 
d. The court adopts the case authority cited by Petitioner of In re Seixas, 
239 Bankr. 398 (9th Circuit), which states the court must look to the intent 
of the parties and substance of the obligation to determine whether it is in 
the nature of family support. 
e. Both the child care and medical expenses incurred by Petitioner in this 
case are in the nature of child support and were nondischargeable in 
Approved as to Form: 
Randy S. Ludlow 
Attorney for Respondent 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY , STATE OF UTAH 
REBECCA J. WARDLE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
RICKY RAY BOWEN, 
Respondent. 
ORDER ON PETITIONER'S 
PETITION TO MODIFY DECREE OF 
PATERNITY AND MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 970903297 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
Commissioner Susan Bradford 
On August 13, 2003, the Petitioner's Petition to Modify Decree of Paternity and 
Motion for Judgment came on for hearing before the Honorable Frank G. Noel. 
Petitioner was present with her attorney, Steve S. Christensen of Hirschi Christensen, 
PLLC. Respondent was not present, but was represented by his attorney, Randy S. 
Ludlow. Based upon the evidence presented to the Court, the Court now enters its 
Order c 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, it is ordered as follows: 
1. Petitioner's Petition to Modify Decree of Paternity is granted as follows: 
a. The Court orders Respondent to pay increased child support for the parties' 
minor child based upon the statutory sole custody worksheet. 
b. Child support is ordered to be $461.12 (four hundred sixty one dollars and 
twelve cents) per month. 
c. Respondent is ordered to pay the increased child support of $461.12 (four 
hundred sixty one dollars and twelve cents) retroactive to February 1, 2001, 
which was the month that the Petition to Modify Decree of Paternity was 
served upon him. 
2. Petitioner is entitled to judgment for arrearages of child support in the amount 
of $7,537.94 (seven thousand five hundred thirty seven dollars and ninety four cents). 
3. The Court awards Petitioner a judgment against Respondent for one half of all 
work related day care incurred by Petitioner in the total amount of $7,075.01 (seven 
thousand seventy five dollars and one cent) for all medical and day care expenses which 
have not been paid by Respondent for his share of those expenses from August 10, 1998, 
the date of the Decree of Paternity through August 13, 2003. 
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4. The Court denies the request of Petitioner for all medical and daycare expenses 
which were incurred prior to the date of the Decree of Paternity. 
5. The Court orders that Respondent pay $6,000.00 (six thousand dollars) to 
Petitioner to assist her with payment of her attorneys' fees. 
6. Petitioner's request for pre-judgment interest is denied. 
7. Petitioner is awarded a total judgment, which includes all of the amounts set 
forth above, of $20,612.95 (twenty thousand six hundred twelve dollars and ninety five 
cents) as well as interest at the statutory rate of 3.41% per annum from the date of this 
Approved as to Form: 
Randy S. Ludlow 
Attorney for Respondent 
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